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Abstract—Modern consumer devices, like smartphones and
tablets, have multiple interfaces (e.g., WiFi and 3G) that attach
to new access points as users move. These mobile, multi-homed
computers are a poor match with an Internet architecture that
binds connections to fixed end-points with topology-dependent
addresses. As a result, hosts typically cannot spread a connection
over multiple interfaces or paths, or change locations without
breaking existing connections.
In this paper, we introduce ECCP, an end-host connection
control protocol that allows hosts to communicate over multiple
interfaces with dynamically-changing IP addresses. Each ECCP
connection consists of one or more flows, each associated with
an interface or path. A host can move an existing flow from one
interface to another or change the IP address using in-band
signaling, without any support from the underlying network.
We use formal models to verify that ECCP works correctly in
the presence of packet loss, out-of-order delivery, and frequent
mobility, and to identify bugs and design limitations in earlier
mobility protocols.
Index Terms—migration; mobile devices; network architec-
ture; in-band signaling; formal methods;
I. INTRODUCTION
The end-to-end argument is a classic design principle of the
Internet. This simple yet powerful idea—that end-hosts should
manage their own communication without the involvement of
intermediaries—was a major factor in the huge success of the
Internet. However, TCP/IP was designed in an era when each
host connected to a single, fixed attachment point. In contrast,
today’s Internet-connected devices have multiple interfaces
(e.g., WiFi and 3G) and can move frequently. To leverage
the full capabilities of modern devices, the end-host protocols
should change to support path multiplicity (where a single
connection is spread over multiple interfaces or paths) and
location dynamism (where hosts can change locations without
breaking ongoing connections).
Existing solutions address location dynamism by redirecting
traffic when hosts move. This requires adding middleboxes
(like home agents in Mobile IP), and leads to inefficient
“triangle routing.” Other solutions, like placing multiple wire-
less access points in the same virtual LAN (VLAN), sup-
port only limited mobility within a single subnet. Previous
research proposals have proposed flat addressing, to allow
hosts to retain their addresses as they move, at the expense
of new scalability and deployment challenges. Other work
that used end-to-end connection protocols was either under-
specified [6], thus missing important subtleties, or exhibited
incorrect behavior [17].
In this paper, we design a provably correct end-to-end
connection control protocol (ECCP) that supports migration,
multiple interfaces, and mobility. The solution works on top
of the IP protocol and location-dependent addresses, enabling
incremental deployment on today’s Internet. Our design rests
on an extensive study of existing protocols and proposals,
and a practical experience in end-host stack design [5]. ECCP
supports location dynamism by allowing a device to inform all
of its correspondent hosts of the new address. Path multiplicity
is supported by allowing a single connection to consist of one
or more flows, each associated with an interface or path. Flows
can change to different interfaces or IP addresses over time,
without breaking their connection.
The TCP/IP network stack couples connection control (e.g.,
starting and stopping connections and flows, and changing
the addresses associated with flows) with data delivery func-
tionality (e.g., congestion control, reliable delivery, and flow
control) in a single transport layer. In this work, we focus
only on connection control, and argue that this functionality
should be logically separate from data delivery. ECCP can be
engineered into an existing transport protocol like TCP, or into
a new sub-transport layer that provides connection control for
multiple data delivery protocols. We give an example of the
latter approach, and share practical lessons on how ECCP can
be integrated in a new network stack [5].
A challenge in realizing an end-to-end protocol like ECCP
is that such protocols are notoriously hard to get right, because
of message re-ordering and subtle corner cases. Mobility and
address multiplicity further exacerbate the problem. To ensure
the correctness of ECCP in face of these challenges, we
modeled the protocol in SPIN [9], formally verifying that it is
free from livelocks and deadlocks—even in face of mobility,
packet loss, and reordering. To our knowledge, this is the first
mobility protocol to be formally verified and the development
of the model is one of our contributions. A unique trait of our
model is the inclusion of network packet loss, duplication,
and reordering. Most previous works on network verification
either did not model message loss [15] or did not model
packet reordering [10, 11, 16]. Fersman and Jonsson [3] did
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model lossy, reordered channels but did not give any details or
analysis of their method of doing so. They also limited their
analysis to safety properties that did not test for livelocks, thus
avoiding issues of fair retransmission of packets (as discussed
in Section V).
In the process of building the model, we found bugs
with both our original design and with an earlier mobility
protocol [17]. We used our verified model to construct a
detailed state-transition diagram for the protocol, which was
used as a guide when building our implementation of ECCP.
Our model guarantees that connectivity is preserved in the face
of location dynamism as long as communicating hosts do not
move at exactly the same time. If hosts do move simultane-
ously, connectivity can still be preserved if the network has
a special “redirection middlebox” that temporarily facilitates
the re-establishment of the connection based on the previous
addresses.
This paper makes the following contributions:
1) Defines correctness requirements for protocols that han-
dle location dynamism and path multiplicity.
2) Shows an in-band signaling protocol that meets these
correctness requirements and does not require changing
the topological nature of Internet addressing or adding
in-network middleboxes.
3) Formally verifies the correctness of the proposed proto-
col.
4) Identifies some key points in the design space of proto-
cols of this type.
5) Implements this protocol as part of a new network
architecture [5] to serve as a proof-of-concept.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we discuss the requirements that must be fulfilled
by a connection control protocol and analyze the related works
to give the reader a sense of where ECCP fits into the broader
network architecture landscape. Next, we will present the
details of the protocol in Section III and offer a discussion of
the design decisions that went into it. Section IV discusses how
this protocol can be used to benefit emerging technologies.
In Section V, we discuss how we formally verified that the
protocol fulfills its correctness requirements. Then, we address
the security of the protocol in Section VI and present a solution
to the problem of simultaneous movement in Section VII.
Finally, we conclude with some final thoughts.
II. PROTOCOL REQUIREMENTS AND RELATED WORK
In this section we define requirements to be met by an end-
to-end connection control protocol to correctly handle both
location dynamism and path multiplicity. We also discuss past
works and how they meet these requirements.
A. Protocol Requirements
In the traditional network stack, the transport layer is re-
sponsible for initiating a connection to another end-point, and
then taking an application stream and dividing it into packets
to send over the connection. The network layer delivers these
packets according to best effort, and the transport layer on the
other end-point reassembles the packets into an application
stream again. With this division of labor, the transport layer
conflates two separate functionalities:
• Data Delivery—takes an application stream and divides
it into packets and flows. It guarantees the delivery
semantics required by the application (e.g., ordering,
reliability) and handles congestion control.
• Connection Control—associates flows with the correct
network addresses and demuxes incoming packets to
flows.
In this work, we treat connection control and data delivery as
logically separate, focusing on the requirements of connection
control.
Traditionally, protocols used by connection control operate
at the beginning and the end of a connection, i.e., when
establishing and tearing down a flow. However, to support
mobility and changing addresses, connection control should
fulfill the following requirement: two communicating hosts
are guarantee continued connectivity whenever the network
addresses of either (but not both) host changes or some (but
not all) of its interfaces go down. To support this requirement,
we develop a connection control protocol that allows hosts to
signal address changes for ongoing flows. This protocol must
operate correctly even when control packets are lost, reordered,
duplicated, or arbitrarily delayed, and must ensure connectivity
in both directions. Further, it should restore connectivity even
when changes happen in quick succession. To handle such
cases, the more recent change has to be able to override
a previous one that is no longer valid. For example, when
moving to a new location before completing a (re)connection
handshake at a previous location.
The ECCP protocol meets the above requirement by allow-
ing connection control to (re)negotiate the network addresses
using an in-band signaling protocol. The connection control
demultiplexes packets to flows, allowing data delivery to make
use of path multiplicity without dealing with low-level network
identifiers. Because ECCP is separate from data delivery, it
should not concern itself with any reliability guarantees.
The requirements for connection control explicitly excludes
simultaneous movement which we formally define as the case
when both hosts move before either one could receive a single
packet1 from its peer informing it of the peer’s new address.
Therefore, this requirement applies only when at least one of
the hosts is able to successfully inform its correspondent host
of the new address it has acquired. We exclude the case of
simultaneous movement because no in-band signaling protocol
can correctly handle this case; rather, additional techniques
must be used, as discussed in Section VII.
B. Related Work
The problems of location dynamism and path multiplicity
have been studied extensively. We will first look at alternative
approaches to using in-band signaling. Then, we will look at
1Note that simultaneous movement talks about a single packet reaching the
peer, not about the completion of a handshake.
2
Feature ECCP MPTCP TCP-Migr TCP-R
Path Multiplicity yes yes no no
Location Dynamism yes yes yes yes
Multiple Data-Delivery yes no no no
Verified Correct yes no incorrect n/a
Xmits During Migration yes yes no n/a
Tests Reverse Conn. yes no no n/a
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF ECCP WITH RELATED WORK
other work that has used in-band signaling to address these
issues.
1) Alternative Approaches: Probably the most widely used
solution to location dynamism is Mobile IP [13, 14]. This
approach uses triangle routing where each device has a “home-
agent” with which it registers its current address as it moves.
When a peer wants to reach a particular device, it sends
packets to the device’s home-agent, which then forwards the
packet to the appropriate location. The approach has two main
drawbacks: (i) it is not as efficient as in-band signaling since
connections need to be established through the home agent and
(ii) it requires a home agent to be aware of a host’s location as
it moves, which is a major privacy concern for devices such as
cellphones whose location history mirrors that of the owner.
Other approaches that implement the so-called loca-
tion/identity split [8, 12, 18, 19] have sought to change the
Internet architecture to allow addresses to move with devices.
The network became responsible for routing on addresses that
were no longer tied to physical locations. These proposals
require significant changes to the network (impacting deploy-
ment) and may not scale well.
2) In-band Signaling Protocols: A comparison of selected
previous works that have addressed either path multiplicity
or location dynamism through in-band signaling is presented
in Table I. TCP-R [6] was the first to propose in-band
signaling for handling location dynamism but did not offer
any details about protocol operation such as sequencing or
retransmission. TCP Migrate [17] specified a full protocol
for in-band signaling to handle migration. However, we have
found that TCP Migrate cannot guarantee reconnections due
to corner cases where packet delay and loss lead to lost
connectivity. This misbehavior is a result of relying on im-
plicit connection control acknowledgments through the data
stream, as described in Section III-C. TCP Migrate also gives
greater security guarantees than the current network stack (and
ECCP) by adding protection against on-path hijacking attacks.
This added security, however, comes at the cost of requiring
heavyweight cryptology.
Multipath TCP (MPTCP) [4] defines a method of using
multiple network paths for one connection at the transport
layer. We envision that ECCP will be used in conjunction
with a transport-layer protocol like Multipath TCP. Location
dynamism is handled in MPTCP by starting new flows on
new addresses instead of by changing the addresses associated
with existing flows. In contrast, our approach allows handling
mobility by either starting new flows or moving existing ones.
Abstraction State
Connection my version number, peer version number
list of flows, peer interface list (IList)
my flowID, peer flowID
Flow my Address, peer Address
TABLE II
STATE STORED BY ECCP FOR CONNECTIONS AND FLOWS
This added flexibility may be useful to some data delivery
protocols.
III. THE ECCP PROTOCOL
The design of ECCP consists of three main parts. First, end-
points perform a handshake to establish a connection with a
single flow. Second, the end-points can add more flows to
the existing connection to use additional interfaces or paths.
Third, the end-points can change the addresses associated with
ongoing flows as attachment points change or interfaces fail.
All of these parts are captured in ECCP’s state machine, as
shown in Figure 1. In the rest of the section we will detail the
protocol that moves connections between these states. Later,
in Section V, we will describe how we used formal modeling
to verify the correctness of the state machine.
A. Establishing a New Connection With a Single Flow
ECCP establishes connections and their constituent flows,
and creates the state necessary to map between flows and
the underlying interfaces used for transmission. Each flow is
assigned its own identifier, called a flowID, which is essentially
an opaque demultiplexing key that maps packets to socket
state. The usage of flowIDs avoids overloading other identifiers
in the traditional demultiplexing “five tuple”, thus solving the
problem of binding the flow to a specific combination of IP
addresses and ports, which inhibits mobility.
Connections start with a three-way handshake, as shown in
Figure 2; these messages initialize the state of the connection
and a single initial flow, as shown in Table II. After estab-
lishing a connection, ECCP places the appropriate IP address
and flowID in outgoing packets and demultiplexes incoming
packets to the right flow based on the flowID. A list of peer
interfaces (ILists) that could be used for establishing new flows
are also exchanged during connection establishment. ILists in-
crease connection resilience by allowing for the establishment
of flows on alternative interfaces if the active interfaces go
down. The connection-establishment protocol ensures several
key properties:
Confirming reverse connectivity. Network paths can ex-
hibit asymmetric connectivity, where host A can reach B but B
cannot reach A. To ensure bidirectional communication, ECCP
uses a three-way handshake where the client sends an ACK to
the server to confirm connectivity on the reverse path, similar
to today’s TCP. A similar three-way handshake is necessary
to reestablish connectivity when a flow changes interfaces or
addresses, as discussed in Section III-C.
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CLOSED
LISTEN
SYN SENTSYN RCVD
ESTABLISHED
NOADDRESS
RSYN RCVD RSYN SENTRSYN SENT RCVD
NOADDRESS RSYN RCVD
Passive open Close
RECV(SYN)
SND(SYN+ACK) SND(SYN)
Timeout
SND(RST)
Close
Active open
SND(SYN)
RECV(SYN)
SND(SYN+ACK)
SND(ACK) RECV(SYN+ACK)
SND(ACK)
Lose address
Lose address
Lose address
Lose address
New address
SND(RSYN)
New address)
SND(RSYN)
RECV(RSYN)
SND(RSYN+ACK)
RECV(RSYN)
SND(RSYN+ACK)
RECV(RSYN)
SND(RSYN+ACK)
RECV(RSYN+ACK)
SND(ACK)
RECV(RSYN+ACK)
SND(ACK)
RECV(ACK)
RECV(ACK)
Fig. 1. The ECCP state machine
Separate demultiplexing keys on each host. ECCP uses
explicit flowIDs that uniquely identify the flow. Each flow
has two flowIDs, one for each host, rather than a single
shared identifier. Each host demultiplexes incoming packets
using only its local flowID, but includes the remote flowID
in outgoing packets so the receiving host can demultiplex on
its own identifier. Using two independent flowIDs offers two
main benefits. First, allowing hosts to pick their own identifier
makes it easier to ensure uniqueness at each end-point. Sec-
ond, having separate identifiers simplifies reasoning about the
protocol and proving properties about flow demultiplexing.
B. Adding Flows to an Existing Connection
Either end-point can add flows to an existing connection,
to spread traffic over multiple interfaces or paths. Figure 3
shows how a client adds a flow between local address A2 and
server address A4; the steps for the server to add a flow are
analogous.
Supporting flexible policies for selecting interfaces. To
establish a new flow, the two end-points must agree on which
pair of interfaces to use. Each host may have its own policies
for selecting interfaces, based on performance, reliability, and
cost. For example, a smartphone user may prefer to use a low-
cost and high-performing WiFi interface for high-bandwidth
applications, instead of a more reliable (but more expensive)
3G interface. (If the WiFi connectivity is no longer available,
the end-point could migrate the flow to the 3G interface to
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Fig. 2. The ECCP protocol for establishing a new connection.
continue the connection.) To support flexible local policies,
ECCP allows each end-point to select its own interface. The
initiating host selects a local interface (and associated IP
address) for the new flow, and sends a SYN packet to one
of the interfaces at the remote end-point. Upon receiving
the SYN, the remote end-point selects a (possibly different)
interface based on its own local policies, and responds with
a SYN-ACK. So, while the initiating end-point may influence
the decision (e.g., by picking a remote interface based on past
performance), the remote end-point has the final say on which
of its local interfaces to use.
C. Changing the IP Addresses of Existing Flows
When a host changes location due to device mobility, VM
migration, or failover, it needs to preserve flow connectivity by
notifying its peers of its new network addresses. We present
the protocol used to update the peers in Figure 4, where the
mobile host changes its address and notifies the stationary
host. Once a mobile host establishes a new address for one
of its interfaces, it runs this protocol on every flow using that
interface.
This protocol can also be used to update the IList even
if the address on active flows does not change (e.g., an
alternative interface established connectivity). In that case, the
new address on the flow simply remains the same as the old
one; only the IList changes. The IList is always updated as
a single entity with the new list overriding the old one. No
incremental update protocol is provided to avoid convergence
issues. Because the IList is not very large, the amount of
communication overhead saved with an incremental update
protocol is not worth the added protocol complexity.
Migrating flows independently. When a host moves, many
of its addresses may change at once. Therefore, it may seem
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Fig. 3. The ECCP protocol for adding a new flow to an existing connection.
more efficient to have migration requests refer to connections
or to interfaces instead of having each host migrate each
flow independently. However, this complicates the protocol
by introducing dependencies between flows, which would
make the protocol harder to verify. It would also complicate
demultiplexing rules by allowing control messages to affect
flows with different flowIDs. In addition, disparate flows can
have different timeout timers and different timers related to
migration events (e.g., how long after a migration to initiate a
migration handshake). For this reason, all migration messages
concern a single flow.
Use of version numbers. Upon receiving a RSYN packet,
a hosts needs to verify that the change of address requested
is not stale. To this end, the ECCP migration protocol uses
version numbers so that a host getting a new migration request
can determine whether the request is newer than the last
one that was processed. For example, if a client moves from
Address A1 to A2 to A3, the server may receive the migration
request for A3 before A2, and must then know to ignore the
old migration request to guarantee correctness. We create a
new version number space and do not reuse the sequence
space of the transport layer to make ECCP independent of
any given transport level protocol. Furthermore, a version
number is global to the connection and not to an individual
flow to give an ordering to IList updates. This ordering is
needed to determine the most current IList even if it is
updated by multiple flows on a connection. The initial version
number is established during the initial SYN handshake, much
like the initial sequence number in TCP. Version numbers
must increase monotonically across RSYN events. We handle
version number wraparound in the same way as TCP handles
sequence number wraparound.
It is noteworthy that our use of version numbers is markedly
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Fig. 4. The ECCP protocol for changing the address associated with an
already established flow. FlowIdm and FlowIds are the ids for the flow while
A5 is the new address and (A5,A6) is the new interface list.
different than sequence numbers in TCP. Namely, we do not
use version numbers for reliability. That is, upon receiving
a packet with version number N, we do not verify that we
have previously received all packets with version numbers
less than N, but rather only verify that N is greater than any
version number previously received. This is in stark contrast to
sequence numbers, which require the processing of all packets
up to sequence number N-1 before the packet with sequence
number N can be processed. We use version and not sequence
numbers because at any given time, a host’s peer only cares
about the current address on a flow and not the history of
address changes that occurred on an interface.
In addition, migration message processing should not be
delayed waiting for stale migration messages, which cannot be
processed because the interface addresses have again changed.
Migration messages should reflect the current state of its
interfaces; the history of migrations does not matter.
Originally, we considered an alternative design that avoided
version numbers. Since each change of a version number is
accompanied by a three-way handshake, we considered instead
requiring flowIDs to change after each successful migration.
This change in flowID establishes an ordering on migration
control packets, as only packets containing the most current
flowID would be accepted as valid. While this method appears
to work (and we formally verified portions of this protocol),
it adds complexity to the protocol and introduces non-obvious
edge-cases into the demultiplexing rules. And in the end, it
only saved a few bytes of space in control packets. Thus,
we instead introduced version numbers for a cleaner protocol
design.
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Fig. 5. An example of a misbehaving protocol trace when using implicit
ACKs. The packet sent at time T1 is delayed and received at time T3, where
it is assumed (incorrectly) to acknowledge the packet sent at time T2 (which
is lost).
Explicit acknowledgments. The ECCP protocol does not
use the same method of implicit acknowledgment of migration
messages as TCP Migrate because we found that method to
have misbehaving corner-cases. TCP Migrate used the fact
that it received data packets on the new address as a de-facto
acknowledgment that a migration message was received. We
illustrate one misbehaving corner case in Figure 5 where the
migration at time T2 is lost but thought to be acknowledged.
To avoid such corner case, we introduce explicit ACK packets
that carry the version number of the migration but can still be
piggy-backed on data packets.
IV. CASE STUDIES: CURRENT AND FUTURE
APPLICATIONS
In this section we will discuss how ECCP can be used to
fulfill the full potential of new and emerging technologies.
For each technology, we will give a brief overview of its
functionality and how it is limited by the current network stack
and then explain how ECCP can help. For some application
we use our implementation of the ECCP protocol to serve as
a proof-of-concept of its utility. The implementation is part
of a broader network architecture project [5], which includes
additional changes to the network. But, the applications we
present here only use the ECCP protocol for their operation.
A. Mobile Devices
Handling physical device movement is a challenge for the
current network stack. Currently device mobility is handled in
one of three ways:
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Fig. 6. This experiment shows the use of multiple flows in ECCP. Between
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operates over the same network paths as flow 1, thus sharing the aggregate
throughput. At time 20s, flow 1’s addresses are changed so that it operates
over a different network path than flow 2, and both flows can then achieve
maximum throughput.
1) Devices can change IP addresses, break any existing
ongoing connections, and rely on application-level re-
covery.
2) Internet providers can use MobileIP [13] with all of the
limitations, as described in Section II.
3) Providers can use various hacks such as large layer-2
VLANs to preserve device addresses when the locations
of devices change. This approach gives up scalable
address aggregation, making it feasible only within a
single enterprise or campus.
In contrast, ECCP supports location dynamism by allowing
devices to simply change their addresses as they move.
B. Devices with Multiple Network Interfaces
Many Internet enabled devices now have multiple network
interfaces. Servers have multiple network cards, each with
its own IP addresses and both smartphones and tablets often
have both WiFi and 3G connections. These devices, however,
cannot fully leverage this multiplicity of network attachments
as each connection is statically tied to a single network
address. Path multiplicity allows such devices to use all their
interfaces for the same connection. For example, figure 6
shows how our implementation can use path multiplicity to get
better throughput on a connection. At the same time location
dynamism allows flows to failover to alternative interfaces if
an interface goes down.
C. Virtual Machine Migration and Failover
Modern servers often run on virtual machines (VMs) to ease
management tasks and create a more flexible infrastructure.
Recently, two new technologies have emerged: Live VM
Migration and Virtual Machine Failover Replication. During
live VM migration, a VM on one physical host gets transferred
to another physical host in a way that is seamless for any
host communicating with it. In Virtual Machine Failover
Replication [2], a primary VM syncs its state with a backup
VM, which can then act as a hot-spare and take over upon
failure of the primary VM.
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Fig. 7. This experiment shows VM migration across layer-2 domains using
ECCP. The throughput shown is that of a client that communicates with a
VM that migrates at 10s. The gap between 10s and 20s is while the VM
has moved to the new location but not yet received a new address (via the
hypervisor cycling its interfaces, causing a new DHCP request), as well as
the delay for TCP to pickup after retransmission timeouts. This graph shows
that communication can be restored even after a potentially long period of
disconnection (although optimizations for faster address reassignment can be
used to reduce this delay significantly).
To make these operations appear seamless to hosts commu-
nicating with the VM, ongoing connections need to migrate
between physical hosts. Currently, this requirement limits
these operations in that the two machines running the VMs
have to reside on the same layer-2 domain so that the layer-
3 address used by the VM can remain static. ECCP would
allow layer-3 addresses to change without breaking ongoing
connections and thus allow wide-area VM migration and
failover replication. Figure 7 shows the throughput between
a client and a migrating server using our implementation.
D. Multi-homing
Many networks are now serviced by multiple ISPs. This is
especially prevalent in datacenters where a single datacenters
can have peering connections with many providers. Currently,
a host has no way to choose the path that its connections
use. A possible solution is to allow ISPs to assign multiple
virtual addresses to a single host interface to allow the host
some control over the possible paths. In this scenario, path
multiplicity would allow hosts to stripe data across different
providers for the same connection.
E. Multipath Networking
The networking community is actively working on ways
to support multipath routing. However, there has been little
research in how to handle demultiplexing on the end-hosts
and allow paths to change in response to mobility. ECCP’s
flow abstraction maps nicely to that of paths by substituting
paths (or pathlets [7]) wherever we currently refer to addresses.
Path multiplicity would allow multiple paths to be used at once
and location dynamism would allow modifying paths without
breaking flows.
V. FORMAL VERIFICATION
Distributed protocols such as ECCP are difficult to reason
about, precisely because they involve multiple independent
hosts that communicate asynchronously over unreliable chan-
nels. Hosts execute in arbitrary order, and messages can be
lost, reordered, or duplicated. These factors lead to a large
number of possible execution traces of the protocol, each
of which needs to be analyzed for correctness. Analyzing
such protocols only informally—e.g., by considering the most
common execution traces—can lead to a belief in protocol cor-
rectness that is later found out to be false, due to misbehaving
edge-cases. Formal analysis, on the other hand, is hampered
by the difficulty in analyzing a very large number of execution
traces in a timely manner.
This section discusses our experience analyzing ECCP using
SPIN [9], a formal verification tool that uses a variety of
techniques to cut down on the complexity of the state-space of
execution traces. Even still, we had to develop several novel
approaches for using SPIN in order to deal with network
packet loss and reordering, as well as to guarantee that packet
retransmission timeouts were executed in a way that did not
interfere with protocol liveness verification. Our model verifies
that the ECCP protocol is free from livelocks and deadlocks, as
well as fulfills its correctness requirement. To our knowledge,
this is the first end-to-end migration protocol to be formally
verified.
In this section, we first discuss the safety and liveness
properties that we use to guarantee ECCP’s correctness, and
provide an overview of SPIN and its verification mechanisms.
Next, we describe our model for ECCP and the challenges
inherent to modeling such networking protocols. Then, we
discuss the completeness and limitations of our verification,
as well as its results. The full SPIN model is presented in a
technical report [1].
A. A Formal Definition of Correctness
Traditionally, a protocol needs to be verified for two proper-
ties to prove correctness: safety and liveness. The safety prop-
erty requires that no execution of the protocol can deadlock.
Deadlocks violate the correctness of ECCP since connectivity
cannot be restored if either host is deadlocked.
The liveness property verifies that the protocol cannot enter
an infinite loop where each execution of the loop makes no
progress towards achieving the goal of the protocol. In ECCP,
the goal of the protocol is to allow hosts to communicate with
each other, as specified earlier in Section II. Thus, we define
the liveness property as the ability to send a message (such
as a ping) to the correspondent host on any flow and get
a response back. Verifying the liveness property guarantees
that data can eventually be transferred between the two hosts
on any execution of the protocol. The combination of the
safety and liveness properties guarantees that our requirement
is satisfied not just for every connection, but for every flow as
well.
B. Verification in SPIN
We now give a very brief overview of SPIN before describ-
ing how we use it to model ECCP. SPIN is a C-like lan-
guage which allows you to define multiple processes and the
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communication between them (notably, using reliable FIFO
channels). An execution trace is a single possible execution
of the SPIN program with a particular process execution and
message delivery order. SPIN analyzes all possible execution
traces to explore all possible protocol executions.
Protocol verification often faces a “state-space explosion”
problem. The execution state includes the values of all global
variables, local process variables, and communication queues,
defined at a single point in time during an execution trace.
The state-space of the verification refers to the set of all
execution states found in all possible execution traces. In
order for verification to complete, the state-space must be kept
relatively small. Yet, exploring all possible execution traces of
a protocol can easily create exponential blow-up in the state-
space! One of the biggest challenges in creating a model is in
using the right amount of simplification to avoid such state-
space explosion, while at the same time making sure that the
model remains sound—i.e., that these simplifications do not
remove misbehaviors that exist in the real protocol from the
model.
SPIN can perform various checks on the states in the state-
space that it verifies. ECCP uses the following type of checks
to verify the protocol:
• Asserts are those familiar C checks that verify some
conditional expression. These checks are used to sanity-
check protocol execution.
• Progress labels are code labels used to mark pieces
of code that must be executed at least once in any
cycle in a execution trace. A cycle in an execution trace
implies a possible loop in the execution of the protocol,
and thus needs to be checked for liveness. Progress
labels are a method of specifying liveness properties by
requiring some parts of code to be reached on every
iteration of a protocol loop. There are two progress labels
in this model. One is located when a host receives a
response message back from its correspondent host. This
verifies the liveness property described above. The second
progress label marks the code that models packet loss, as
described in the next section.
• Safety checks are used to verify that the code never
deadlocks. They are implemented by simply verifying
that each state in the state-space has a possible transition
to another state. This verification checks that any state
visited by SPIN either transitions to another state or
that the state marks the end of one possible run of the
verification. This verifies that no deadlock exists, since a
protocol that is deadlocked would be in a state that would
not be able to transition to any other states.
C. Modeling ECCP in SPIN
The SPIN verification models two hosts communicating
with each other using a single flow. We first describe how the
model represents hosts, communication, and addresses. Next,
we discuss how we represent flowIDs, which present special
challenges due to their randomness. Finally, we describe why
modeling only two hosts and communicating over a single
flow is sufficient to prove the correctness of a protocol that
operates in an environment with many hosts and supports the
use multiple flows.
At a high level, the model represents each host as a different
process. Network communication is modeled using a global
array of FIFO queues. The index of the queue element corre-
sponds to an address. Each host process reads from the element
in the array corresponding to the address of its interface and
writes to the queue element corresponding to the address it
wants to send a packet to. Modeling migration is done by
changing the array element a host process uses to receive data.
The mobile host then sends ECCP protocol messages to the
stationary host informing it of the new “address” (i.e., array
element) it acquired. The stationary hosts then changes the
array element it uses to communicate with the mobile host.
We also needed to model ECCP’s randomized flowIDs. But,
SPIN, like most formal method verification methods, cannot
deal with randomness well. In order to verify a protocol with
randomness, the verifier has to evaluate all possible values for
the random variables, which leads to intractable state-space
explosion. Thankfully, even though the ECCP protocol uses
randomness, we can avoid introducing randomness into the
model, while still checking for the same semantic properties
in ECCP. After all, flowID randomness is used for two
purposes: (i) to prevent flowID guessing by off-path entities
and (ii) to ensure that different hosts use different flowIDs.
The former property is a security rather than safety property,
and we do not verify security in our formal model. The
latter property, on the other hand, is needed to be modeled
in order to ensure that packets meant for other hosts are
dropped (as discussed previously in Section V-C). But we can
avoid randomness (which prevents flowID collision with high
probability) while preserving unique flowsIDs by just centrally
assigning different flowsIDs to different hosts. This change
allow us to remove the use of randomness in our model, and
therefore avoid the corresponding state space explosion. Note,
that we do not model the highly unlikely case that a flowID
collision occurs. This case can only affect protocol correctness
if it causes a packet meant for one host to be processed by
another. For that to occur, multiple unlikely events need to
happen: a host moves to a new address that was recently
occupied by another host, gets a delayed packet meant for
the old host, and that packet has the same flowID as one of
its flows (this event by itself has a probability on the order of
2−32).
It is sound to model only two hosts because the protocol
insures that hosts cannot interfere with each other. The only
possible way that two hosts could interfere would be if a
packet meant for one host, gets processed by another. But,
two different host would, with high probability, have different
flowIDs for their flows. Since any packet which is received
with a flowID that does not correspond to an active flow
is dropped, packets meant for other hosts would never be
processed.
Similarly, it is sound to model only two flows because we
can show packets that are meant for one flow are not pro-
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cessed by another and that shared flow state can be reasoned
about without a formal model. Incoming packets always get
processed by the correct flow because all demultiplexing is
based on flowIDs which are guaranteed to be unique for each
flow on a given host. The only shared state that flows (of
the same connection) have are peer interface lists and version
numbers, both of which are easy to reason about without
formal models. The only property that is necessary to verify
about the correctness of interface lists is that a host can always
update its state with the single most recent list it got from its
peer. This property directly follows from our use of version
numbers. Since we don’t need to model versioning of interface
lists and the only property of version numbers used by the
protocol is that they are monotonically increasing, we can also
ignore the fact that version numbers are shared across the flows
of a connection. From the point of view of an individual flow,
other flows could only cause version numbers to “skip ahead”,
which would not effect their monotonicity.
D. Challenges in Modeling an Unreliable Network
ECCP should operate correctly over a network with only
best-effort delivery guarantees. Therefore, our verification has
to simulate packet loss, reordering, and duplication. Modeling
these network effects can create state-space explosion. We
now describe how we model these effects in SPIN while
keeping the increase in state-space manageable. Next, we de-
scribe challenges encountered when modeling ECCP’s packet
retransmission as a response to packet loss.
1) Loss and Reordering of Network Packets: The model
of ECCP has to simulate loss and the reordering of packets
in the network. Natively, SPIN does not model loss and
reordering since most application-layer protocols sit on top of
an existing transport layer that guarantees reliability. ECCP,
however, is below the transport layer and its messages are
not sent reliably. Previous work [3] had identified two major
ways of modeling these network effects: (i) a separate process
non-deterministically take packets out of the communication
queues and drop or reorder them and (ii) non-deterministic
loss or reordering when sending or receiving packets.
After testing both approaches, we conclude that the second
approach is much more efficient. Having a separate process
reorder packets leads to more state-space explosion because
the verifier checks all possible interleaving of the process
that simulates packet loss and reorder with the host pro-
cesses. However, it does not matter to the protocol when
the packet it received was reordered (e.g., five or ten steps
earlier), just whether a reordering or loss event occurred.
By limiting loss and reordering events to send and receive
operations, we vastly reduces the state-space without affecting
the soundness of the protocol verification. The implementation
of the operations that simulate the network effects has to
avoid creating unnecessary branches in the state-space. For
example, even though reordering necessitates the creation of
new states corresponding to the new order of messages in
the queue, the changes to the global state-space should be
minimized to this minimal change. But, reordering requires
the use of temporary variables to store intermediate values.
These temporary variables are part of the state space and
changing their values creates unnecessary branches in the state
space. This is resolved by resetting all temporary variables to
a constant after their use, which merges the state-space branch
back to a common value.
We model network effects inside the send operation. The im-
plementation of the network effects inside the send operation is
hidden from the host, which simply invokes the send operation
to send packets. This solution encountered some challenges
dealing with the semantics of SPIN. We refer the reader to
the technical report [1] for further details.
2) Timeouts: Any network protocol that operates over a
lossy network needs to have a notion of timeouts to retransmit
packets that may have been lost. SPIN, however, has no notion
of time, and so does not directly model timeouts based on
clock time. SPIN does, however, have a predefined boolean
called “timeout” that is activated whenever no process can
perform any operation. In effect, the timeout flag creates a
secondary set of operations in each process that are activated
whenever the primary set of operations is blocked for all pro-
cesses in the system. In our model, we used this secondary set
of operations to perform retransmission. Intuitively, whenever
the regular operation of the protocol cannot make progress,
retransmission kicks in to try to remedy the situation.
The above technique works well if the timeouts that re-
transmit packets are fair. Fairness is a property that states
that if we have two or more processes, each individual
process will eventually get a chance to perform its operations
in every execution. Fairness guarantees that a infinite loop
involving only one process will never be explored (i.e., all
processes are guaranteed to eventually execute). This is critical
for retransmission timeouts because the message sent from
either one of the host processes could have been lost, and
therefore that particular sender has to retransmit the packet.
If the retransmission code from the other process is executed
infinitely often, thus starving the sender, then the packet will
never be transmitted and no progress will be made; the verifier
will report a progress violation. SPIN, however, only has
the notion of weak fairness – which means that fairness can
only be enforced on operations that can always be executed.
Our implementation of retransmission—that is, using SPIN’s
timeout boolean—does not meet this notion of weak fairness,
as it can only be executed when there are no other actions to
take in the system.
Retransmission does not meet the requirements for weak
fairness and therefore SPIN could not natively enforce fairness.
Therefore, we had to explicitly force the model to execute
retransmission timeouts fairly. Recall that each process in
SPIN represents a single host, each of which may need to
perform retransmission of packets to its peer. So, we enforced
fairness among the timeout blocks of all host processes. This
was done by creating a global queue of the host processes and
then forcing the execution of timeouts to occur in the same
order as the processes queue.
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E. Completeness
In model checking, the gold standard for verification is
if one’s model reaches a fixed point. This means that all
state transitions from the set of states that have already been
explored lead to other states in this same set. In other words,
state exploration is complete. Unfortunately, this model does
not reach a fixed point due to version numbers. New migration
events create new states because they have to increase the
version number and thus new states can always be created.
Thus, this model cannot validate all possible migration events
over time. It has, however, been verified with up to five
migrations. We could not get the model to verify for 6
migration events due to the increased memory requirements
for the added state-space. It is believed that all subsequent
migrations would be congruent to the first five, but this has
not yet been proven.
F. Results
The verification of the protocol ran on a Sun SunFire X4100
server with two dual-core 2.2GHz Opteron 275 processors and
16GB of RAM. As expected, the runtime of the verification
was highly dependent on the number of migration events that
could occur. For 5 migration events, the progress property was
verified in 14 minutes and 32 seconds and used 5297 MB of
memory; the safety property verified in 3 minutes 18 seconds
and used 3129 MB of memory.
The model verified the ECCP state machine, which
we present in Figure 1. An unexpected finding was the
RSYN SENT RCVD state in the state machine. This state is
necessary to ensure correctness when both hosts move before
the migration protocol for either host fully completes. This
state was only found thanks to a progress property violation
in a previous version of the model.
VI. SECURITY
ECCP, like other connection-based network protocols, is
potentially vulnerable to two main classes of malicious attacks:
denial of service (DoS) and hijacking. A protocol is particu-
larly vulnerable to a DoS attack if a request from an unverified
party causes a host to spend a asymmetric amount of resources.
The classic example of a DoS attack is SYN flooding, where
cheaply crafted (and typically spoofed) SYN packets cause a
server to allocate kernel memory buffers. Nothing in the ECCP
protocol requires excessive memory or computation to process
the initial handshake or the migration protocol. SYN cookies
can also be used to prevent the allocation of kernel state to a
new connection before return reachability is tested.
Protocol support for migration introduces new potential
threats from attackers, who may try to (i) hijack ongoing con-
nections by inserting control messages into the communication
stream, or (ii) disrupt connections by sending fake migration
messages. Fortunately, ECCP prevents such attacks from off-
path entities by requiring the presence of nonces during
migration. Nonces are 64-bit random values that are exchanged
during flow setup; all subsequent control messages, including
migration requests, must be accompanying by the appropriate
nonce. Without on-path visibility into the control messages,
off-path entities have no way of determining the correct nonce
without resorting to online brute-force search. Brute-forcing
this nonce by forging control packets is infeasible, as it will
require an average of 263 messages to find a match.
Migration protocols could also provide protection against
on-path attackers. For example, TCP Migrate [17] resists on-
path hijacking by using public-key cryptography to secure
its control packets. On-path entities are still free to simply
drop packets, of course. ECCP avoids such computationally-
expensive means and its non-cryptographic solution does not
mitigate on-path hijacking, but in this regard, it is no less
secure than existing protocols like TCP that do not support
migration. Connections that require protection against on-path
attackers should use (or are already using) higher-level mech-
anisms for securing the data stream, such as SSL. Securing the
data stream is necessary for data integrity or confidentiality,
while neither ECCP nor TCP Migrate protect against on-path
attacks against availability.
VII. SIMULTANEOUS MOVEMENT
The ECCP protocol supports mobility whenever the two
communicating hosts do not move at the exact same time.
However, an in-band signaling protocol, without any additional
mechanisms, cannot handle simultaneous changes in location.
When two hosts undergo simultaneous movement, each host
moves before it receives a message from its peer about that
peer’s new address. In this scenario, each host does not
know the new address of its peer. Therefore, neither host can
notify its peer of its new address and neither will receive a
notification of its peer’s new address.
We now discuss one mechanism that can enable the com-
municating hosts to recover their connection. It is possible
to use a triangle-routing solution which uses globally-known,
statically located, network-level elements (home-agents). In
this solution, each host registers its location with its designated
home-agent as it moves around the network as in Mobile
IP [13]. During simultaneous movement, hosts can contact the
home-agents of their correspondent hosts to learn their new
locations. This solution is heavyweight in that it requires that
most hosts on the Internet have static home agents with which
they register their locations, which requires a lot of additional
infrastructure and the purchase of home-agent services. This
solution also undermines the location privacy of hosts by
creating a central location which is aware of the full movement
history of the host. This is an especially big concern for
personal computing devices as we discussed in Section II.
We propose an alternate solution to allow connection re-
covery during simultaneous movement. In this solution, each
network should have a local redirection middlebox, which
keeps a short-lived redirection cache of the new locations of
hosts that have recently moved out of its network. When a
host moves, it should send its new address to the redirection
middlebox of its old network to populate the redirection
cache. Upon receiving a new cache entry, the redirection
middlebox takes over (via gratuitous ARP-flooding or a similar
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mechanism) the old topological address of the moved host for
the duration of the life of the cache entry. If the redirection
middlebox gets an RSYN packet for an address in the cache, it
simply forwards it to the new address of the host. All packets
other than RSYN packets can be dropped by the redirection
middlebox. The address of the redirection middlebox can be
learned when a host joins a network (e.g., through DHCP).
The duration of time during which a redirection box must
cache an entry can be short, measured in seconds, as it just
needs to enable a single RSYN exchange between the two
hosts and is not useful after a connection breaks because it
exceeded its retransmission count and timeout. For this to be
effective, only one of the communicating hosts needs to be
part of a network with a redirection middlebox. This scheme is
lightweight since the cache entries are short and decentralized.
It also preserves privacy since a host needs to notify only the
redirection box of the last network it visited of its new address
rather than some central entity that knows the full history of
its movements.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The Internet architecture needs to evolve to offer better
support for new technologies such as mobile devices and VM
migration. Given that a complete overhaul of the Internet is
not realistic, the ECCP protocol offers a way to incrementally
evolve the Internet to support location dynamism and path
multiplicity. We believe that this extension to the network
stack is relatively easy to deploy and adds much needed
functionality. It can also serve as a robust tool for future
innovation that adds better support for multi-interface and
multi-path communication in the transport layer.
A significant part of this paper was formal verification of the
correctness properties of the ECCP protocol. This verification
was not only useful in checking the correctness of the final
protocol but also motivated the design by making us aware,
early on, of the subtle edge-cases that we needed to consider
for this class of protocols.
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